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THE GUNIAN AND HIS GUN'
ANDREW A. BRUCE
2 and SHURL ROSMARIN
3
The cases of People v. Macklin, People v. Murray Hum phreys
and People v. William Scott which recenly arose in the Criminal
Court of Cook County, Illinois, present matters of paramount im-
portance. They involve the difficult but ever present problem of the
suppression of the practice of carrying concealed firearms, and per-
haps the prosecutions were brought, and the trial judge, who tried
the cases without a jury, rendered his findings of guilty, in the hope
that either the Supreme Court of Illinois would overrule or modify
its prior holdings in regard to the admissibility of evidence which
has been illegally obtained, or would overrule, or further explain.
modify or qualify its prior announcements in regard to the right to
arrest without a warrant; perhaps he hoped that in the Macklin case
it would be ready to make applicable the rule of the "right prowler,"
and that even in the cases where a night prowler was not concerned,
in the face of the present menace of the gunman and the added fact
that at the very moment of their search and examination the defend-
ants were committing the crime of carrying concealed weapons and
that the very discovery of the gun furnished conclusive evidence of the
reasonableness and of the necessity for the arrest, it would feel com-
pelled to sustain the conviction and to make the law of today re-
sponsive to and adequate to the needs of today.
In the Macklin case the evidence disclosed that on July 6, 1933,
at 10:40 o'clock at night, three Chicago policemen, while riding in a
squad car, saw the defendant walk away from a gas station and join
another man. They testified that, on account of numerous recent
robberies of such stations, their suspicions were aroused and they
according stopped the men, although they had no direct evidence of
either of them having committed or being about to commit a crime.
One of the officers then, and with no previous knowledge or evi-
dence that the defendant carried a weapon, put his arms around
him, no doubt to satisfy himself in regard to the matter, and the
man then made a movement to get into his hands, and thus revealed
'This article was written at the suggestion of the Chicago Crime Com-
mission.
2Professor of law, Northwestern University.
aStudent. Northwestern University School of Law.
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the existence of, a revolver which was concealed on the front of
his person.
The man was arrested for the crime of carrying concealed
weapons. On the trial, which was before the court after the waiver
of a jury, a motion was made to suppress the evidence and for a
return of the weapon. This motion was denied, the defendant was
found guilty and an appeal was taken.4
In both the Humphreys and the Scott cases the arrests were
made in the day time and were the results of a police raid on a
supposed Al Capone gang headquarters. When the police entered
the room, nothing very suspicious was discovered but while they
were there Humphreys entered. He had long been suspected by the
police but on this occasion they had no evidence against him nor any
warrant of any kind. They, however, searched him and found a
revolver concealed upon his person. On the trial for carrying con-
cealed weapons, and on the police testifying that, though they had
no warrant against anyone, they suspected him of a murder which
had recently been committed but for which no warrant had been
issued, he was convicted of the crime of carrying concealed weapons
and was sentenced to a term in the House of Correction. Strangely
enough no appeal was taken.
In the Scott case a search of the person was made without any
warrant, in the day time and without even the excuse that the de-
fendant was suspected of having committed any kind of a crime.
This case, however, we understand is being continued from time to
time and its difficulties have no doubt been avoided by recently
bringing the defendant for trial and obtaining his conviction on an
old charge which everyone had heretofore believed had been aban-
doned. This charge grew out of the arrest of the defendant William
Scott on July 16, 1930, while he lay in a drunken stupor in an auto-
mobile and the finding of two revolvers in the machine. The con-
viction no doubt was the result of the theory that the arrest for
drunkenness was lawful and that therefore the guns were admissible
in evidence on a subsequent charge of carrying concealed weapons.
In considering these cases we must bear in mind that in Illinois
the carrying of concealed weapons is only a misdemeanor,5 and that,
as far the statutes are concerned, the right of search is limited to
cases where the person has been charged with a felony and, seem-
4Reversed in People v. Macklin, (Ill.) 186 N. E. 531.
5Smith-Hurd's Statutes (1929). secs. 155, 156.
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ingly, has been arrested therefor, and then only under the direction
of the judge or justice of the peace and in his presence."
Three questions are presented:
(1) Should evidence wrongfully obtained be admitted in a
case where the gist of the action is the carrying of concealed weapons
and the weapon itself is conclusive evidence of guilt?
(2) In the Macklin case, was the evidence in fact illegally
obtained? Has not an officer a right to arrest or detain for inter-
rogation a man whom he finds at 10:40 at night in a place which
creates suspicion and, if so, and in spite of the statute above referred
to, does not such right of interrogation involve the right to search
the person, and, though the attention of the officer was first called
to the person on account of a suspicion of robbery or attempted
robbery alone, to use a weapon which has been thus discovered as
evidence in a prosecution for carrying concealed weapons?
(3) Is there a distinction between the procedure which is or
should be adopted in a case where human life is involved and one
in which a sumptuary law merely is sought to be enforced or evidence
obtained which may help in a prosecution for its violation? Is there
a clear distinction between the discovery of a pistol on a man, the
only use of which is to kill and the concealment of which in itself
constitutes a crime, and the discovery of liquors or documents or
even of narcotic drugs which may or may not be unlawfully used, and
which at the most are only evidence of a possible or contemplated
crime. Is not the concealed revolver in itself a nuisance which
should be summarily abated? In the case of the liquor or the docu-
ments or the drugs is there not a search merely for evidence which
may or may not be indicative of guilt? In the case of the concealed
gun is there not a direct attempt to suppress a nuisance and does
not the thing suppressed constitute conclusive evidence of the com-
mission of a crime and of a crime which when once discovered the
defendant is committing in the presence of the officer-? While they
may concede that drugs or liquor or papers may or may not be un-
lawfully used or possessed, should not the courts be allowed to take
judicial notice of the fact that the primary use of the revolver is to
take human life? Is not the menace of the gunman too great a
eSmith-Hurd's Statutes (1929), Sec. 699. The section reads as follows:
"When a person charged with a felony is suspected by the judge or justice
of the peace before whom he is brought to have on his person a dangerous
weapon, or anything which may be used as evidence of the commission of the
offense, the judge or justice may direct him to be searched in his presence, and
such weapon or other thing to be retained, subject to the order of the court
in which the defendant may be tried."
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menace to be trifled with? Should not society be allowed some
measure of self-protection?
The problem of the gunman is, and for a long time will con-
tinue to be, an ever present problem in America. Perhaps the logical
solution would be the total prohibition of the sale of arms to un-
licensed persons, but even this would not put a stop to the evil, since
not only is there a large supply of weapons already in circulation
and the smuggling in of arms is an easy thing, but among the crooks
and the gangsters and in the underworld generally there is so much
mechanical skill that the manufacture can always be engaged in.
Perhaps, indeed, a wide-spread prohibition of the carriage and sale
of arms would merely result in the underworld being armed while
the law-abiding citizenry would be without weapons.7 In any event,
we must face the problem of the carrier of concealed weapons and
the dilemma which is presented by the rule of law which has been
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by many
of the state courts, including that of Illinois, that if an arrest is made
illegally in the first instance, that is to say, either without a sufficient
warrant or without probable cause for believing that the defendant
has committed or is committing a crime, a pistol or other incriminat-
ing article, even though discovered on the person of the man ar-
rested, is not competent evidence against him in a subsequent prosecu-
tion. We must also be prepared to meet the limitations which are
placed on the right to arrest without a warrant and the limitations,
if any, which are imposed by the Illinois statute, to which we have
before referred and which says nothing of misdemeanors or of the
police or arresting officers and merely provides that when one is
charged with a felony and is suspected by the judge before whom he
is brought to have on his person a dangerous weapon such judge
may direct him to be searched in his presence.
The leading cases on the subject in the state of Illinois are those
of People v. McGurn,8 and People v. DeLuca,9 People v. Scalisi,0
and People v. Kissane.11 In the case of People v. McGurn it was
7This at any rate was the position which was taken by many at the Anti-
firearms Convention which was held in the city of Chicago under the auspices
of the National Crime Commission. Among the Anglo-Saxons, and prior to
and at the time of Edward the Confessor when the general absence of trade
and commerce resulted in a large number of unemployed wanderers, all free
persons were required to go armed. Sharon Turner, History of Anglo Saxons,
Vol. III. 130.
'341 I1. 632. 173 N. E. 754 (1930).
9343 I11. 269.
1060 Ill. 361.
11261 Ill. App. 621. Affirred in People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385. See also
People v. Roberts (Ill.) 185 N E. 283. See post note.
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held that, although a revolver was found upon the person of the
defendant and the carrying of concealed weapons was made by
statute an offense, since the arrest was made without a warrant and
at the time of the arrest there was nothing which would lead a reason-
able and prudent person to believe that the person who was arrested
was implicated in any crime which had in fact been committed, and
specifically the crime of carrying concealed weapons, the arrest was
unlawful and that when the defendant was afterwards indicted and
tried for the crime of carrying concealed weapons it was error on
the part of the trial court to deny a petition for the suppression of
the evidence and to admit the pistol in evidence, and this even al-
though when being searched by the officer the defendant himself
disclosed the existence and whereabouts of the weapon by saying,
"Don't get excited! Don't get excited! You will find it on the right
side." In answer to the contention that, even though the arrest and
search and seizure were illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
not competent, yet the defendant should be convicted because he was
in fact guilty of the crime of carrying concealed weapons, the Su-
preme Court quoted with approval from the case of Hoyer v. State,
1 2
in which the Wisconsin Court had said:
"Sec. 11, art. I, Wis. Const. supra, is a pledge of the faith of
the State government that the people of the state, all alike (with no
express or possible mental reservation that it is for the good and
innocent only), shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable search and seizure. This security has
vanished, and the pledge is violated by the state that guarantees it
when officers of state, acting under color of state-given authority,
search and seize unlawfully. The pledge of this provision and of
sec. 8 are each violated when use is made of such evidence in one
of its own courts by other of its officers. That a proper result-
that is, a conviction of one really guilty of an offense-may be thus
reached is neither an excuse for nor a condonation of the use by
the state of that which is so the result of its own violation of its own
fundamental charter. Such a cynical indifference to the state's ob-
12180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N. W. 89, 93, 27 A. L. R. 673, 680 (1923). See
to the same effect Hughes v. State, 2 Ga. App. 29, 58 S. E. 390; Lewiv v.
Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 449, 247 S. W. 749; Helton v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky.
678, 243 S. W. 918; Robertson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535; Tillman v.
State. 81 Fla. 558, 88 So. 377; Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 25 S. E. 608, 59
Am. St. 226; State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S. E. 434; Snead v. Boniwil,
166 N. Y. 325, 59 N. E. 899; People v. Kinney, 185 N. Y. S. 645; People v.
Jakira, 193 N. Y. S. 306. See also Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio State 340, 1 N. E.
76; Rosey v. Cicolino, 1 Ohio App. 194. But see contra People v. Didonna, 210
N. Y. S. 135.
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ligations should not be judicial policy. Such constitutional provisions
here invoked are not grants of rights of action for trespass against
official or individual violators of such guaranteed rights, for other
provisions of the constitution give such remedies. To say, then, that
when the state itself has thus violated its own pledges it may use
the results thereby obtained for its own purpose, become a party
to the trespass by ratification, trace its title through wrongful acts
of its officers, remain itself immune, in its sovereignty, from legal
liability, and then relegate the individual whose rights are thus swept
away and made valueless in and by a court of justice to his boot-
less and fruitless action of trespass against such trespassing state
officials as individuals, is to gibe and to jeer."
The Illinois Court also said:
"In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385,
40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319, 24 A. L. R. 1426, the Supreme Court
of the United States upon this question said: 'The government now,
while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks
to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by
that means which otherwise it would not have had. The proposition
could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course
its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may
study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may
use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a
more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Con-
stitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages that
the government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the
forbidden act. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed.
652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, 34 S. Ct. Rep. 341, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1117,
to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly before the
grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two
steps are required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the
law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. 232
U. S. 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann.
Cas. 1915C, 1177. The essence of a provision forbidding the ac-
quisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not
be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus
obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them
is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the government's own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way proposed.' "
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In the case of People v. De Luca we find an even more extreme
holding, and although it does not pertain to a gunman its authority
cannot be ignored. In it the evidence showed that certain game
wardens had heard rumors of game law violations and while the de-
fendant was riding in a railroad train saw some feathers sticking
out of his pocket and on searching him for evidence of his guilt
found four hen pheasants on his person. Thereupon they arrested
him and instituted a criminal prosecution for the violation of the
game laws. In spite, however, of the conclusive evidence of guilt
furnished by the pheasants and the certainly reasonable ground for
an arrest or at any rate for a search which was furnished by the
projecting feathers the Supreme Court held that, since the arrest
was subsequent to the search, the evidence was obtained in pursu-
ance of an unlawful search and was therefore inadmissible. It is to
be noted, however, that to this holding there was filed a dissenting
opinion by Justices Stone and De Young who held that the evidence
disclosed that an offense had been committed in the presence of the
officers, that the protruding feathers furnished reasonable grounds
for the arrest and that the search and the arrest were but part of
one transaction. s
'bPeople v. De Luca, 343 Ill. App. 369. In the opinion of the majority
of the court we find the following:
"Evidently, if the hen pheasants had not been found by a search of the
person of the defendant he would not have been arrested. In such case
there would have been no probable cause for his arrest. There would have
been nothing to indicate that the feathers were those of hen pheasants and
not of cock pheasants or of some other birds. The evidence was obtained by
the unlawful search.
"Undoubtedly the law is that where an arrest is made by an officer who
has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested is implicated in
the commission of a crime, such officer has a right to arrest without a war-
rant and to search the arrested person without a search warrant (People v.
Caruso. 339 Ill. 258, and cases cited), but where there is no probable cause
and the person is searched without a search warrant in an effort to discover
evidence, and an arrest is afterwards made solely on the strength of the
discovery, the evidence thus obtained is violative of his constitutional right
and should be suppressed, on motion duly made for that purpose. People v.
Brocarnp, 307 Ill. 448; People v. Castree, 311 id. 392; Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145; People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 638.
"The inherent right of all citizens to immunity from unreasonable search
and seizure is guaranteed by both State and Federal constitutions. This right
was violated by an unlawful search of the defendant without a warrant and
before his arrest. The criminal court erred in denying the appeal upon the
strength of such evidence." See United States v. Shultz, 3 Fed. Supp. 273.
"In their dissenting opinion Justices Stone and De Young, among other
things, say:
"We do not concur in the foregoing decision. An arrest is defined as a
legal restraint of the person; custody. (Webster's International Dict.) It
is evident from the record that the search and arrest in this case were but
one act. The evidence shows that the officers making the search and arrest
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In the case of People v. Scalisi, also, the Illinois court has seem-
ingly placed rigid restrictions upon the right to arrest for the purpose
of questioning. In it it said:
"That the police squad were attempting to arrest the persons
in the Cadillac car at the time in question is shown conclusively
by the evidence of Conway, the leader of the squad. They were
attempting to make what the assistant state's attorney, in his oral
argument before this court, called an "arrest for questioning.' Un-
der the common law in England sheriffs, constables, and watchmen
were authorized to arrest felons, and persons reasonably suspected
of being felons, without a warrant, and as conservators of the peace
they also had authority to make arrests without warrants in cases
of misdemeanors which involved breaches of the peace committed
in the presence of the officers making the arrests, and could not be
stopped or redressed except by immediate arrest. 2 R. C. L. 446;
North v. People, 139 Ill. 81; 28 N. E. 966; Kindred v. Stitt, 51 Il.
401. Policemen were unknown to the common law, but they are gen-
erally considered as having the same powers as watchmen and con-
stables. Shanley v. Wells, 71 Ill. 78. At common law watchmen
and beadles had authority to arrest and detain in prison for examina-
tion any suspicious nightwalker. Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14;
2 Hawk's P. C. c. 13, sec. 6, Id. c. 12, sec. 20; Miles v. Weston, 60
Ill. 361. By paragraph 681 of the Criminal Code (Cahill's Rev.
Stat. 1925, c. 38), in this state an arrest may be made by an officer
or by a private person without warrant for a criminal offense com-
mitted or attempted in his presence, and by an officer when a crim-
had been informed that the law protecting game birds had been violated.
They saw feathers, which were those of a hen pheasant, protruding from the
coat pocket of'the plaintiff in error. They had therefore reasonable ground
for believing that he was implicated in the violation of the statute prohibiting
the possession of hen pheasants. This belief was reasonably based on what
they saw in his possession before searching and arresting him. The search
and seizure against which the citizen is protected by constitutional guaranty
is unreasonable search and seizure and does not extend to immunity from
search on arrest. (People v. Hord, 329 Ill. 117.) The guaranty of the con-
stitution has no application to arrests for offenses consisting wholly or in
part in having particular property in possession. In such cases the right of
seizure is incidental to the right to arrest. (North v. People, 139 II. 81.)
The search under the circumstances of this case cannot be said to be un-
reasonable.
"It is the rule in this State, and generally, that when an officer has reason-
able ground for believing that a person is implicated in the commission of a
crime he may arrest such person without a warrant and search him without
a search warrant. People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258; People v. Swift, 319 id. 359;
Lynn v. People, 170 id. 527; North v. People, supra; Gindrat v. People, 13a
Ill. 103; 5 Corpus Juris. 434.
"The opinion adopted is contrary to the rule long adhered to in this State,
as the cases above cited show, and puts an unwarranted restraint upon offi-
cers of the law in the discharge of their duty."
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inal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground
for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it. When
such arrest is made without a warrant, either by an officer or a
private person, the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay
be taken before the nearest magistrate in the county, who shall hear
the case for examination, and the prisoner shall be examined and
dealt with in cases of arrest upon warrant. Crim. Code, par. 684.
As in this State a criminal offense consists in a violation of a public
law, in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint
operation of act and intention or criminal negligence, and may be
either a misdemeanor or a felony, the term 'criminal offense' in
paragraph 681 must be held to include misdemeanors as well as
felonies, and thereby the right of officers to make arrests is much
greater than at common law. It is the rule in this State that an
officer has the right to arrest without a warrant where he has reason-
able ground for believing that the person to be arrested is implicated
in a crime. People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359, 150 N. E. 263. Whether
or not in a given case there are reasonable grounds to warrant an
arrest is a mixed question of law and fact. To justify the officer
in making an arrest without a warrant, his ground for belief that
the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime must be such as would
influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious man under the cir-
cumstances. Kindred v. Stitt, supra."
In summing up, the Illinois Court said:
"When the police squad sought to infringe upon the liberty of
plaintiffs in error, and arrest and detain them for questioning, they
had no reasonable ground to suspect that either plaintiff in error
had been guilty of any crime, and plaintiffs in error were not night-
walkers or vagrants, and hence the attempt to arrest and detain
them was unlawful. The court, in the instructions to the jury, did
not differentiate as to the effect of the two kinds of malice, but by
its instructions authorized a verdict of guilty of murder, if Olson
was unlawfully killed with malice, either express or implied, even if
at the time of his death he was attempting to unlawfully restrain
plaintiffs in error of their liberty. The peculiar facts in this case
required that the jury be instructed as to the right of police officers
to make arrests, their right to use deadly weapons in attempting to
arrest for misdemeanors, the right of a citizen to resist an unlawful
arrest, the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and as to
the form of verdict for manslaughter."' 4
24 talics added.
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The fourth of these cases is that of People v. Kissane, and, al-
though it was rendered in the Appellate Court for the First Judicial
District and not in the Supreme Court, should be given much con-
sideration both on account of the more satisfactory rule thdt it ap-
pears to announce but on account of the high judicial standing of
the members of the tribunal and on account of the fact that living
as they all do in the city of Chicago where the problem of the gun-
man is especially acute, its judges had, perhaps, a closer view of the
menace and a more complete realization of the needs of the situa-
tion. In this case no warrant had been issued but the police testified
that the Lake View Trust and Savings Bank had been robbed by
a man two days before the arrest of the defendant; that all of the
members of the police department were furnished with a description
of this person and that the description furnished was that of a man
between five feet eleven inches and six feet tall, sallow complexion,
slender build and a kind of pointed nose; that immediately after the
police received the description the arresting officer and his police
partner talked the matter over and decided that the description
fitted Kissane; that, though no warrant was issued they arrested
Kissane because "his general appearance tallied with a man who
held up the Lake View Trust and Savings Bank a few days before;
that the arresting officer knew the defendant well; that the latter was
well known to the police as a gangster; that he had been charged
with murder, robbery and racketeering; that the officer himself had
arrested him for some other offense prior to the time of the arrest
in question and that in the present case, and after his arrest, he
searched him and found a gun upon his person."
No satisfactory proof evidently being forthcoming as to the bank
robbery the man was charged with and convicted of the crime or
misdemeanor of carrying concealed weapons and on this trial the
pistol was permitted to be used in evidence and the defendant was
convicted. This judgment was sustained by the Appellate Court,
all of its judges holding that no error had been committed in the
denial of a motion to suppress the evidence. In its opinion 5 the
court said:
"Defendant did not offer any evidence in rebuttal of this testi-
mony and the trial court thereupon denied the motion to suppress
the evidence. The jury was then recalled and the trial proceeded.
'Undoubtedly the law is that where an arrest is made by an officer
15See People v. Kissane, 261 Il. App. 621, 626. Affirmed in People v.
Kissane, 347 11. 385. See notes post. See also People v. Roberts (Ill.) 185
N. E. 283.
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who has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested is
implicated in the commission of a crime, such officer has a right to
arrest without a warrant and to search the arrested person without
a search warrant. (People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, and cases cited.)'
(People v. De Luca, 343 Ill. 269, 271. See also People v. Swift, 319
Ill. 359.) 'To justify an officer in making the arrest without a war-
rant his ground for belief that the person to be arrested is guilty
of a crime must be such as would influence the conduct of a prudent
and cautious man under the circumstances. (Kindred v. Stitt.
supra.)' (People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 636.) In People v. De
Luca, supra, the judgment of conviction was reversed because it ap-
peared that the defendant was searched without a search warrant
in an effort to discover evidence and an arrest was afterwards made
solely on the strength of the discovery, and it was held that the evi-
dence thus obtained was violative of the constitutional rikhts of the
defendant and should have been suppressed on his motion duly made.
In People v. McGurn, supra, the judgment was reversed for the same
reason. In the instant case the People and defendant agree that the
arrest was made before the search. The arresting officer testified
that as he approached defendant he touched him on the shoulder
and told him that he was under arrest, at the same time showing
him his police star. Defendant testified that when the officer ap-
proached him he 'stuck his gun' in the back of defendant and at the
same time said to him, 'You are going to the can.' There was no
rebuttal evidence offered by defendant, and we are of the opinion
that the People made out a prima facie showing that the officer had
reasonable grounds for believing that defendant was the man who
robbed the Lake View bank. Defendant does not contend to the
contrary. His position is that 'the action of the Court in iefusing
to hear and determine the legality of the search before the trial, was
reversible error,' and that the hearing had during the trial did not
cure the error, regardless of what the proof then showed. We are
unable to agree with this contention."
This case (People v. Kissane) was recently affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Illinois (People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385) in a per
curiam endorsement of an opinion written by Commissioner Edmunds.
The court in this opinion said: "Section 4 of division 6 of the Crim-
inal Code provides that an arrest may be made without a warrant
by an officer when a criminal offense has in fact been committed
and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it. (Cahill's Stat. 1931, chap. 38, par. 681.)
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Where an arrest is made under such circumstances the officer has
a right to search the arrested person without a search warrant.
(People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258; People v. DeLuca, 343 id. 269.)
Whether or not the officer had reasonable ground for believing that
plaintiff in error had committed the bank robbery is a mixed question
of law and fact, the circumstances to show it reasonable being the
fact and their sufficiency when shown being a question of law. No
general rule applicable to every case has been, or probably can be,
announced as to what facts will constitute justification, in law, for
an arrest without a warrant, other than that such grounds of sus-
picion exist as should influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious
man under the circumstances. Each case must be considered upon its
own facts. (People v. Doody, 343 Ill. 194; Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S. 132.) Counsel contend that there is, in effect, no evidence
which this court can consider as justifying the arrest, asserting that
the testimony of the police officer is "unworthy of belief." They
characterize this testimony as an "obviously false story" and a "pre-
posterous story," basing such statements, apparently, on the conten-
tion that it appears that plaintiff in error was released from jail about
five hours after his arrest and that it does not appear that he was
ever formally charged with the bank robbery. We cannot accede
to the argument that we must reject the officer's testimony as a false-
hood, and our opinion is that the arrest and search were proper."
Since that time, also, and in People v. Roberts (Illinois, April 7,
1933) 185 N. E. 253, we find another case which goes far in the
matter of admitting evidence which has been obtained on a question-
able arrest and in sustaining an arrest without the preliminary of a
warrant. From this case, however, both Justices Dunne and De
Young dissent. The evidence shows that four or more police officers
entered a building in Chicago Heights about ten o'clock on the night
of September 30, 1930, and arrested two girls whom, the officers
said, admitted to them that they were living there and were practic-
ing prostitution. The officer also arrested the man who was pointed
out by the girls as the owner of, and in charge of, the hotel and
then inquired of the girls if anyone else was connected with the
place. The girls replied that there were a couple of sluggers, who were
their men, in the storeroom on the ground floor of the same building.
The officers went downstairs to this room, which was fitted up as
and supposed to be a gymnasium, but was apparently operated in
connection with the house of ill fame. Upon entering the store-
room, the officers saw three men sitting at a table, and asked them
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to stand up. The men remained seated, and -were told by the police.
'We are police officers; stand up.' The men did not stand up as
requested, and officers Sherping and Levine seized them and then
searched each of them. Pistols were found on plaintiff in error and
Montascato, and they were taken into custody by the police. The
officers then searched the entire building, examined the safe, and
found men's wearing apparel in one of the upstairs bedrooms. The
policemen had no warrant for the arrest of any person residing or
being in the building, and had no search warrant authorizing the
search of the building or any person in it. There is no evidence
that there was any loud noise, disorder, breach of the peace, or un-
usual cause for the officers entering the building and making the
arrests and search, though one of the officers testified that when fhey
started out from Chicago he had information that the place was a
house of prostitution and the other officer stated that they were out
raiding the place. Officer Levine also stated that he was positive
there was prostitution practiced there, and that the officers had
reasonable ground to believe Roberta and Montascato, who the girls
said were their men, had some connection with the conduct and op-
eration of the place.
The court said:
"By section 657 of the Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St.
1929, p. 1056, f. 38) in this state an arrest may be made by an officer
or by a private person without a warrant for a criminal offense
committed or attempted in his presence, and by an officer when a
criminal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The term 'criminal offense,' used in the statute, has been construed
to include misdemeanors as well as felonies. People v. Scalisi, 324
Ill. 131, 154 N. E. 715. Where a criminal offense has, in fact, been
committed, an officer has a right to arrest without a warrant where
he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested
is implicated in the crime, and such officer has a right to search the
arrested person without a search warrant. People v. Caruso. 339 Ill.
258, 171 N. E. 128; People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179 N. E. 850.
The right of such search and seizure is incidental to the right of
arrest. People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N. E. 754. Whether or
not in a given case there are reasonable grounds to warrant an arrest
is a mixed question of law and fact. No general rule applicable to
every case has been or probably can be announced as to what facts
will constitute justification, in law, for an arrest by an officer with-
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out a warrant, other than that such ground of suspicion or belief ex-
ists as should influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious man
under the circumstances. Each case must be considered upon its
own facts. People v. Kissane, supra; People v. Scalisi, supra.
"Sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Rev.
St. 1929, p. 987, c. 38) provide for the punishment of any person
having any connection with a house of prostitution or ill fame,
whether in the capacity of owner, keeper, patron, or inmate. When
the officers, one of whom said he had previous information that the
place was a house of prostitution, entered the second floor of the
building, where the girls were, the latter admitted that they were
carrying on prostitution there, and told the officers that Roberta and
Montascato were their men and were sluggers for the place and were
downstairs in the gymnasium storeroom, where the officers later ar-
rested them. Before their arrest, no information was obtained from
the two men, or through any property belonging to them, that they
had an interests in or connection with the place. However, from the
information which the police received from the girl inmates, it was
reasonable for the officers to believe that the place was being con-
ducted as a house of prostitution, and that these men had some con-
nection therewith, which was a violation of the law. Under such
circumstances, we think the seizing of the men by the officers, which
we take it was then considered by them as an arrest, and their being
taken into custody, was justified. The search of the arrested par-
ties without a search warrant was incidental to the lawful arrest, and
the taking of the guns, and the introduction thereof on the trial as
evidence against the men on the charge of carrying concealed wea-
pons, was proper. Plaintiff in error's motion to suppress evidence
was properly denied.
"There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment of
the Appellate Court will be affirmed."
This case goes a long way. The officers had no search or other
warrant and their only excuse for entering the building was that
they were informed that it was a house of prostitution. What the
nature of that information was they did not disclose and if it had
been actual evidence they could certainly have made it the basis of
a search warrant. They then arrested the girls and upon the in-
formation which the girls gave to them they seized the two men de-
fendants who were afterwards prosecuted for carrying concealed
weapons. All that the girls, however, said was that they were sluggers
and, certainly, the girls furnished no evidence that they were actually
THE GUNMAN
connected with the carrying on of the House. Perhaps it was per-
fectly reasonable for the officers to presume that these men had some
connection with the business, but unless the original entry was lawful
the courts that adhere to strict rules would hardly say that informa-
tion subsequently obtained could be lawfully used. The real fact
of the case was that guns were found upon the men and that the
guns furnished the evidence of the reasonableness of the arrest. Why
did not the courts say so?
So far this is the nature and the import of the Illinois decisions
and though we cannot but approve of the conclusions which are
reached and the law which announced by both the Appellate Court
of the First Judicial District and the Supreme Court in the cases
of People v. Kissane to which we have just referred, we cannot
help but realize that in many respects these opinions differ from
and are antagonistic to the former holdings of the Illinois Supreme
Court. It appears to us that to a much wider extent they justify
arrest and upon suspicion alone and to us they appear to have been
motivated, and we believe rightly, by the realization of and the de-
sire to combat the fact that a man with a gun is a public menace
and that the very finding of the gun upon him in itself proves the
reasonableness of the arrest. Unless indeed the Supreme Court will
be willing to reverse or to modify its prior holdings we see no way
of ultimately sustaining the convictions of such men as Humphreys
and Scott both of whom were arrested in the day time and without
warrants and in the absence, according to the decisions of the Su-
preme Court, of any offense which had been committed in the presence
of the officers or made known to them except by the means of the
arrest and of the search.
When, however, we come to the case of the defendant Macklin.
who was arrested at 10:40 at night, we find a different situation and
so far the decisions decidely stop short of holding that an arrest and
search, such as was made of this gunman, and the subsequent in-
troduction in evidence of the revolver which was found upon his
person, will or should be held improper by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. The clause in the Scalisi casel'---"and plaintiffs in error
were not nightwalkers or vagrants and hence the attempt to arrest
and detain them was unlawful"--and the prior admission that "at
common law watchmen and beadles had authority to arrest and de-
tain in prison for examination any suspicious nightwalker" should
be, full of meaning. Though, indeed, in the case of People v. Mc-
18Supra note 11; 60 Ill. 361.
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Guru" the arrest was made at 11:30 and in that of People v. Scalisi"s
at 9:30 in the morning, and in neither of these cases were night
prowlers involved, in the case of People v. Macklin, which we are
principally considering, the arrest was made at 10:40 o'clock at night,
and was the result of the suspicion which was aroused by the men
being seen loitering in the neighborhood of a filling station.
In spite of this background in the law and in the authorities,
however, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the Macklin case,
and seems to have announced practically the same rule in regard
to the nightwalker as in regard to the wanderer by day. "An arrest,"
they said, "was not justifiable unless the person had committed some
disorderly or suspicious act. . . . An arrest may be made by an
officer or by a private person without warrant, for a criminal offense
committed or attempted in his presence, and by an officer when a
criminal offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable
grounds for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.
To justify an arrest by an officer without a warrant his ground for
belief that the person arrested is guilty of an offense must be such
as would influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious man under
the circumstances. The evidence discloses that the plaintiff in error
was committing the offense of carrying a concealed weapon at the time
the police officers approached him. When, however, the plaintiff in
error was arrested -the officers had neither knowledge nor informa-
tion that he had committed any offense whatever. The acts which
aroused the suspicions of the officers were that, late at night the
plaintiff in error had called at a gasoline service station, and that after
leaving it, he and another man walked together along a public street.
It is not charged that either loitered about the premises of another
person in a suspicious or disorderly manner. The plaintiff in error
did nothing before his arrest to indicate that he was about to commit
an offense of any character. It was only after one of the officers
placed his hands upon him that he manifested any attempt at re-
sistance. This act was subsequent to and hence not the cause of the
arrest. No overt act of a criminal tendency had been committed
and nothing the men did led the officers to suspect either of them of
the specific offense of carrying concealed weapons."
All this may be true, but what the officers did suspect was that,
in view of the numerous recent gas station robberies, the man was not
in the station for any lawful purpose. They, too, saw the other man
17Supra note 5; 341 Ill. 632.
2860 II. 361.
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waiting in the neighborhood. Men as a rule do not visit gas stations
at night on foot and whether a man is a suspicious character or not
depends much upon his appearance.
The rule of law announced certainly gives to the public, and to
the police themselves who are constantly being shot by these micre-
ants, but an inadequate protection. Must the criminal, we ask, al-
ways be allowed to fire the first shot?
In this case, indeed, we had hoped that the Supreme Court
might have been able to see a distinction, to apply the doctrine of the
night prowler and to affirm the judgment of the court below and
unless the Illinois statute in relation to the examination of persons
arrested for felonies, and which we will later consider, is held to
present an insurmountable obstacle. 9
In the case of Miles v. Weston,20 in an action of trespass and
false imprisonment, it appeared that "on the night of the arrest two
men had been walking the street in front of defendant's house, ap-
parently taking observations, and, when anyone approached they
would separate and come together again and thus-kept lurking around
for about an hour and a half and until late in the evening when the
defendant became alarmed at their suspicious conduct, went after and
brought two policemen to the place and there found the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff giving no account of himself and admitting his
presence there for two hours, one of the policemen arrested him and
he was taken to the station."
A suit was brought against the defendant, a private citizens,
for trespass and false imprisonment. A judgment was rendered for
the plaintiff but was reversed on appeal on the ground that the
instructions were not sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff and from
what we can learn from the opinion we are almost satisfied that the
court thought that a verdict should have been directed for him. In
its opinion the court said:
"In Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, it was held that watch-
men and beadles have authority, at common law, to arrest, and de-
tain in prison for examination, persons walking the streets at night
when there is reasonable ground to suspect felony, although there
is no proof of a felony having been committed. And it has been
said by Hawkins and others, that every private person may, by com-
mon law, arrest any suspicious nightwalker and detain him until
he give a good account of himself. 2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown,
19Smith-Hurd's Stat. (1929) Sec. 699." See note 3 supra.
2060 Ill. 361.
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c. 13, sec. 6, c. 12, sec. 20. And it has been held that a person may
be indicted for being a common nightwalker, as for a misdemeanor.
2 Hawk. P. C., c. 12, sec. 20.
"Where a person is taken up in the night as a nightwalker and
disorderly person, though by a lawful officer, it has been considered
that the arrest would be illegal, if the person so arrested were inno-
cent, and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead
the officer. Tooley's Case, 2 Lord Raym. 1296.
"The reason why night-walking and lurking about the premises
of peaceable inhabitants in the night time is disorderly conduct, is
because such conduct cannot, in general, be for any but a bad pur-
pose, and it tends to the annoyance and discomfort of peaceable
citizens, who have a just right to be exempt from such disturbance.
What family, in a large city like Chicago, so frequently infested
with burglars and other desperate criminals, could retire to their
beds and enjoy the quiet and repose due to them, when they were
conscious that suspiciously acting persons were lurking about their
premises? And will it be said that the law gives no right to have
such persons arrested and removed, until a burglary is actually com-
mitted or attempted? The right of arrest in such cases, by the
proper officer, is supported by the same reasons and necessity today,
that it was in the earlier history of the common law, and its exist-
ence we maintain without hesitation. We do not say that the plain-
tiff below was guilty of such disorderly conduct; it is not our prov-
ince to do so; but we do say that, in the facts disclosed by the evi-
dence, lay the materials for a plea of justification."
If it is not now considered permissible to search a night prow-
ler we have no doubt that by statute it can be made so. A night
prowler is per se enough of an object of suspicion to arrest and
detain him for examination. Though the Supreme Court of the
United States in construing and enforcing the liquor laws in the case
of Carroll v. United States,21 did not go to the length of holding that
all automobiles were subject to suspicion and liable to search, it
nonetheless held that the Fourth Amendment only denounces such
searches and seizures as are unreasonable and it justified a distinc-
tion in the Federal statutes in regard to the liability of officers who
searched without a warrant and which limited that liability generally
only to private dwellings and held that in the case of "other build-
ings or property should only exist where the search was made mali-
ciously and without probable cause."
21267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280.
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The right to arrest a night prowler on suspicion and for ex-
amination being conceded, there can be no doubt of the right to search
for the gun and of the admissibility of the weapon later in evidence.
There are many cases, indeed, to the effect that any person who is
lawfully arrested or detained may be searched for a possible weapon
if for no other purpose than for making sure that he has no means
with which to effect an escape.
22
It is also well settled that a person who is legally arrested and
who on being searched discloses evidence which constitutes proof of
the commission of another crime or offense than that for which he
has been arrested cannot object to the introduction of that evidence
on a prosecution for that other offense.2 3
22Gaines v. State, 230 Pac. 946 (Washington, 1924).
23ln Gaines v. State, 230 Pac. 946 (Washington, 1924) the defendant was
convicted of the illegal possession of narcotic drugs. The judgment was
affirmed, the court held that one illegally arrested may be searched for prop-
erty connected with the offense which may be used as evidence against or
for weapons or things which might facilitate his escape. In State v. Hayes
(Oregon, 1926) 249 Pac 637, the defendant was arrested for a crime com-
mitted in the presence of the officer, namely, that of an assault on the offi-
cer. The defendant's subsequent conviction for the unlawful possession of
intoxicating liquors was upheld on the theory that the officer had the right
to arrest the defendant and after the arrest the right to search his person as
an incident thereto and on which search intoxicating liquor was found. In
People v. Kissane (Illinois, 1932) 347 Ill. 385, the defendant was arrested
without a warrant on the belief of the officer that he had robbed a bank.
After he was arrested and his person searched a gun was found. The de-
fendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Judgment was af-
firmed. In Moore v. State (Oklahoma, 1931) 1 Pac. (2) 813, the defendant
was driving down a highway, weaving from one side of the road to the
other. The officers chased him for committing a misdemeanor. They had
no warrant. Upon searching the car, liquor was found and defendant was
convicted for transporting liquor. The conviction was affirmed and the evi-
dence held admissible since the search was made after an arrest for a mis-
demeanor committed in the officers' presence. In State v. Korth (Iowa, 1927)
215 N. W. 706, the defendant was arrested in a store being suspected of
having stolen articles. The defendant was taken to the jail and there being
searched morphine was found on her and she was tried and convicted of
the crime of the illegal possession of narcotic drugs. The judgment was
affirmed. The evidence was held admissible. In Milam v. United States, 296
Fed. 629, the officers arrested defendant for possession of narcotics and a
search of the house disclosed liquor. It was held that the latter evidence
could be used against him. In State v. McKindel (Washington, 1928) 268
Pac. 593, where the defendant was convicted of receiving and concealing
stolen property a search warrant had been issued for the search of liquor
and for liquor alone. While on the premises the officers recognized the stolen
goods and arrested the defendant and the prosecution for receiving stolen
goods. A motion to suppress the motion was denied. The court held that being
lawfully on the premises it was the duty of the offiers immediately on learn-
ing that defendant has stolen goods in his possession to make the arrest and
to seize them. In United States v. Murphy, 264 Fed. 842, Vouled v. United
States. 264 Fed. 839, Veeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 and Welsh v.
United States, 267 Fed. 819, it was held that when a person was arrested for
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But it is not with night prowlers alone that we are concerned.
Although, perhaps, the majority of our gunmen ply their trade at
night there are many who do not hesitate to operate in the light of
day. Of course, if in these cases as well as in those of night prowl-
ers, the Federal court and the Supreme Court of Illinois would
repudiate their later holdings in the cases of People v. McGurn2' and
Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States25 and Weeks v. United
States2" and return once more to that of Adams v. New York 27 and
hold that evidence, though wrongfully obtained, if in itself probative,
can be introduced in a subsequent criminal prosecution, leaving the
parties merely to their action for damages, the problem would be
largely solved. In these later cases, however, these courts adopt a
strict rule. "The courts," they say, "were instituted as a part of the
Constitution and therefore they should not ignore the rights of the
individual. If evidence is allowed to be obtained without a warrant,
the Fourth Amendment is reduced to a mere form of words and
might as well be stricken from the Constitution." 28  As far as their
own jurisdictions are concerned they seem inclined to limit the right
intoxication whatever was found on his person could be later used as evidence
against him.
In Pitts v. State, 14 Ga. App. 283, 80 S. E. 510 (1914), the defendant
was convicted for carrying a concealed weapon and the conviction was af-
firmed. The arrest was made for an offense other than that of carrying
concealed weapons. The court said: "The obtaining of self-incriminating
evidence by illegal search and seizure the defendant's person must be re-
garded as compelling him to furnish testimony against himself and evi-
dence thus obtained is without probative value against him, but when evidence
of one's guilt of carrying a deadly weapon is obtained by a search of his
person while he is in the legal custody of an officer under an arrest for a
different offense and the search is necessary in order to disarm the prisoner
for the safety of the officer the evidence is not illegal. See also Dozier v.
State. 107 Ga. 708, 33 S. E. 418. To the same effect see Sewell v. State (Ala-
bama) 13 So. 555 (1893).
In French v. State (Alabama) 10 So. 553, the defendant was arrested for
violation of a municipal ordinance which was committed in the officer's pres-
ence. He was later searched and a pistol was found upon him. He was
then prosecuted and convicted and the conviction was sustained.
There are a number of cases where such evidence is held not admissible
in cases of search warrants, that is to say, where the warrant was issued
for the recovery of stolen property and intoxicating liquors were found.
There is a wide distinction, however, between evidence obtained as the re-
sult of a lawful arrest and a search afterwards and evidence obtained merely
on a fishing expedition under the form of a search warrant. See People v.
Pretss, 195 N. W. 684 (Mich., 1923); State v. Jarvey (Wash., 1930) 288
Pac. 923.24People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632; also People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448;
People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392.
25251 U. S. 385.
26232 U. S. 383. See United States v. Shultz, 3 Fed. Supp. 273.
27192 U. S. 585.
28Silverthorne v. United States. 251 U. S. 285; Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383. -
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to arrest without warrant and, above all, to hold that evidence which
has been illegally obtained by Federal officers cannot later on be used
by such officers in a criminal prosecution, that is to say, if a prior
demand for its return has been made.2 9  All of the Federal cases,
however, are supported by references to the Fourth Amendment and
none of them have intimated that the Fourth Amendment is incor-
porated in and a part of the Fourteenth, but on the other hand to hold
that when it comes to the admissibility of evidence which has been
obtained under lawful arrest or the question of the extent to which
the state may arrest without warrant, the matter is one for the de-
termination of the state courts when state offenses alone are in-
volved. 30 Though, indeed, Illinois has so far chosen to follow the
Federal leadership3' and to announce a doctrine similar to that
which was stated in the Weeks and Silverthorne cases, there is noth-
ing to prevent it from making a change of front. Already, indeed,
a large and growing number of State courts have adopted the more
liberal rule which prevailed in the case of Adams v. New York and
which is strenuously contended for by both Professors John H.
XVigmore and Simon Greenleaf and to the effect that after all the
matter is one of evidence, that the evidence of the gun or other
object is as evidence of the best, no matter how obtained, and that
the Constitution is sufficiently adhered to if a suit for civil damages
be allowed for any wrong committed in the obtaining.32 As we
29Crawford v. United States. 5 .Fed. (2d) 672; Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383; Rowan v. United States, 281 Fed. 137; Gordon v. United States,
18 Fed. (2d) 531.
30See Weeks v. United States, supra note 9; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, supra note 9.
31People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632; People v. Brocamp. 307 Ill. 448; People
v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392; People v. Scarainuzzo, (Ill.) 185 N. W. 578. See note
by James T. Hatcher in 20 Kentucky L. J. 358.
32See Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) Vol. 4, sec. 2183 et seq.; Green-
leaf on Evidence, Vol. I, sec. 254A. See numerous cases cited in Wigmore
on Evidence (2d ed.) Vol. 4, sec. 2183. See also State v. Kanellos, 115 S. E.
636; Mata v. State (Indiana), 179 N. E. 916; State v. Dillon (New Mexico)
218 Pac. 474",Hall v. Commonwealth (Virginia) 130 S. E. 416, 143 Va. 554;
Meisingqer v. State, 155 Md. 195, 141 At. 536, 142 Atl. 190; Nolan v. State
(Maryland), 146 AtI. 268; State v. Fahn, 53 N. D. 203, 205 N. W. 67; Com-
monwealth v. Dabbierio (Pennsylvania), 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679; Common-
wealth v. Connolly, 290 Pa. 181, 138 AtI. 682; State v. Lyones (New Jersey),
99 N. J. L. 301, 122 Atl. 758; State v. Chuchola (Delaware), 120 Atl. 212;
State v. Reynolds (Connecticut) 125 AtI. 636; State v. Lacy (North Dakota)
212 N. W. 442; Roberts v. People (Colorado), 243 Pac. 545; Hall v: Common-
wealth (Virginia), 138 Va. 727, 121 S. E. 154; State v. Maes (South Carolina),
127 S. C. 397. 120 S. E. 576, 114 S. E. 317; State v. Rollinger (Iowa), 225
N. W. 841; Morgan v. State (Indiana), 151 N. E. 98; People v. Defore (New
York), 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585; State v. Chin Gim (Nevada), 224 Pac.
798; Cians v. State (Ohio), 105 Ohio 229, 137 N. E. 11; State v. Pauley (North
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before stated, the case of Weeks v. United States3 fairly overrules
the prior and equally considered opinion in the case of Adams v.
New York34 and although it is true that in the Weeks case 5 and
in some of the Illinois decisions38 an attempt is made to distinguish
the former holdings on the ground that in them no demand was
made for return of the property or the evidence before the trial was
entered upon, and that in these prior holdings the courts had merely
denied the right to try collateral issues, the distinction is hardly
convincing, that is to say, if a substantial constitutional right is
really involved. Certainly it is not recognized in the case of invol-
untary confessions.
3 7
Why, we ask, on account of the present exigency and of the
widespread use of firearms by the criminal classes, should not the
Dakota), 192 N. W. 91; Commonwealth v. Wilkins (Massachusetts), 138 N. E.
11; State v. Hempley (South Carolina), 120 S. C. 339, 113 S. E. 123; State
v. Aime (Utah), 222 Pac. 704; Billings v. State (Nebraska), 191 N. W. 721;
State v. Tonn (Iowa), 195 Ia. 94, 191 N. W. 530; People v. Case (Michigan),
220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289; People v. De Cesare (Michigan), 190 N. W. 302;
People v. Woodward (Michigan), 190 N. W. 721; (Liquor seized on entering a
home to arrest on a frame.) People v. Saltis (Illinois), 160 N. E. 86; Welcheck
v. State (Texas) 247 S. W. 524; Yohner v. State (Texas), 247 S. W. 533; McNeil
v. State (Texas), 247 S. W. 536; Brown v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 147, 242 S. W. 218;
(Liquor seized during an arrest for an offense in an officer's presence) ; Cumpton
v. Muskogee (Oklahoma), 225 Pac. 562; (Liquor seized without warrant during
arrest for an offense committed in an officer's presence); State v. Fleckinger
(Louisiana), 152 La. 337, 93 S. 115; Ware v. State (Wisconsin), 230 N. W.
80. See also Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. I, sec. 2548; Adams v. New York,
192 U. S. 585; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Massachusetts) 329; Leggatt
v. Tallervey, 14 East. 302; Jordan v. Lewis, 14 East. 306; Commonwealth v.
Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519; Commonwealth v. Acton, 165 Mass. 11; Common-
wealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370; Chastand v. State, 83 Ala. 29; State v. Flynn,
36 N. H. 64; State v. Edwards. 51 W. Va. 220; Shields v. State, 100 Ga. 511;
State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489.
Compare also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 and Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.
S. 700, where forcible induction into the state having the jurisdiction was
held not to prevent the trial.
38232 U. S. 383. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, which was de-
cided in 1885, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure was so related t6
the Fifth Amendment prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination that the Fifth
Amendment could be invoked by an accused to withhold from surrender docu-
ments sought by even a lawful official search; and that documents obtained
by unlawful official search could be excluded from evidence as a consequence
of the Fourth Amendment. See Wigmore on Evidence (4th ed.) Vol. 4,
secs. 2183. 2264.
34192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904). The Illinois cases of People v.
McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, People v. Pratt, 314 Ill. 518, and People v. Brocanp,
307 Ill. 448, which announce the doctrine of inadmissibility to all intents and
purposes overrule those of Grundrat v. People, 138 Ill. 103; Trask v. People,
151 11. 523 and People v. Paisley, 208 I1. 310.
35232 U. S. 383.
36People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632; People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448; People
v. Wynn, 324 Ill. 428.
37Grigsby's Criminal Law 232; Bro-zon v. People, 91 111. 506.
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Supreme Court of Illinois once more reverse itself, adopt the rule
argued for by Professor Wigmore and upheld by the majority of
the State Supreme Courts and return once more to the holding of the
case of Adams v. New York.3"
As has so well been pointed out by Professor John Barker Waite
in a very recent article3" the Supreme Court of the United States
itself appears to be willing to admit that after all it is merely a ques-
tion of judicial preference and of a judicial conception of public
policy. Which is better, to suppress the nuisance, to make it possible
to convict the guilty and to secure some measure of protection to the
outraged and long suffering public, or to suppress the evidence lest
"the Government should play an ignoble part?"4o Which is the more
important, the protection of the many individuals who annually are
killed or robbed by the use of the revolver, or the protection of the
somewhat fanciful individual and supposedly constitutional rights of
the far lesser number of persons who prey upon them and who seek
the aid and the protection of a law and of a government with which
they are at war and which they despise? Mr. Justice Holmes, who
perhaps is the principal proponent of the present United States rule,
says that it is a question of the weighing of the relative importance
of two objects of desire, one that the guilty may be convicted and
the public be protected and the other that the dignity of the law
and of the Government shall be preserved; and that at no time shall
the officers of the law be allowed to profit by doing an illegal thing
and at no time shall the Government "play an ignoble part."' 41 He
contends that no matter what happens, the dignity and privacy and
independence of the individual must be preserved. He holds, in
38192 U. S. 585.
soPublic Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 Mich. Law Rev. 749.401n Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438.
41In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, Mr. Justice Holmes says:
"There is no body of precedents by which we are bound, and which con-
fines us to logical deduction from established rules. Therefore we must con-
sider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have, and make up
our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be de-
tected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. . . . We
have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."
In People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13 (150 N. E. 555) Judge Cardozo took
a contrary position and said that under the rule announced by Justice Holmes:
"The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through overzeal
or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most
flagitious. A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered
man is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the other cir-
cumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime. ....
Like instances can be multiplied. We may not subject society to these dangers
until the Legislature has spoken with a clearer voice."
BRUCE & ROSMARIN
short, that the admission of the evidence would be totally destructive
to our American individualism and would reduce the Fourth Amend-
ment to a mere form of words, and would make the Constitution
the subject of a gibe and a jeer.4 2  But after all, apart from the
American citizenship the Federal government is but an intangible
thing, and though the Federal officers should not be allowed to seek
protection from or to profit by their own wrongs, the profit and the
protection that would be afforded by the more liberal rule would not
be so much to the officers as to the law abiding people as a whole.
Is it not fair to assume, and would it not be fitting for both the
Illinois and the United States Supreme Courts themselves to admit,
that the adoption of their present stringent rule and the reversal of
their prior decisions took place without a full consideration of the real
menace of the gunman and was, in part at least, due to the protest
against and the unrest which arose from the numerous and often
unwarranted searches which were made in liquor cases and in the
enforcement of an unpopular law, and that the danger of such un-
reasonable and exasperating arrests is now over? Would it not be
proper for them to admit that the carrying of concealed weapons is
becoming an alarming public menace which the very safety of society
demands shall be summarily abated? Is it not time for them to
admit that in handing down their later decisions and in reversing
their former rules in regard to admissibility of evidence, the exigency
of the firearm was not sufficiently called to their attention and that
in every field of law the firearm has occasioned the reversal of prior
rules and of prior decisions? Since the advent of the firearm, no
longer is one required to retreat to the wall. 2 Since the advent of
the firearm no longer is an overt act necessary before a person can
shoot or kill in defense nor is the actual ability of the assailant to
42See Yoyne v. State, 180 Wis. 407; People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632.
43The change in this old doctrine was brought about by the firearm, be-
cause it presented difficulties not seen at the time when the doctrine was orig-
inally established. See Inbau, Firearms and Legal Doctrine, 7 Tulane Law
Review 529. And at least two appellate courts have frankly admitted
the reason for their change. In State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 327,
104 N. W. 971, 975, a L. R. A. (N. s.) 49, 63 (1909), the court said: "The
doctrine of 'retreat to the wall' had its origin before the general introduction
of guns. Justice demands that its application have dud regard to the
present general use and to the type of firearms." A federal court was bold
enough to hold likewise. In Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412 (D. C., 1923),
this language is found in the court's opinion: "The common law rule, which
required the assailed to retreat to the wall, had its origin before the general
introduction of firearms. If a person is threatened with death or great bodily
harm by an assailant, armed with a modem rifle, in open space, away from
safety, it would be ridiculous to require him to retreat. Indeed, to retreat
would be to invite almost certain death." See note by Clarence Rothenburg
in 20 Kentucky L. J. 362.
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commit harm a matter of importance." If only one reaches his
hand to his hip pocket it is generally held that as far as the person
assailed is concerned an intention to draw a pistol and to shoot him
may be presumed. 5 This is the case even when the pistol in the
pocket, is not loaded.48  It is even the case -where there is no pistol
in the pocket at all.4 7 These changes in the law have arisen on ac-
count of the exigencies of the cases and the very nature of our new
weapons. At a time when fists and clubs or swords were practically
the only weapons the rule of retreating to the wall and the overt act
might have been proper. But changed circumstances and changed
exigencies make new rules. Where the reason for the law faileth
that law also fails.
4 8
Time and time again the courts have sanctioned violations of
seemingly well established personal rights on the ground that other-
wise a basic law or police ordinance could not be enforced and the
public evil or the public nuisance be abated. They have held saloon-
keepers liable for selling to minors even though the sales were
made against their express prohibitions and instructions. They have
held persons liable for unlawful sales to minors and habitual drunk-
ards even though they had no knowledge of the infancy or habitual
tendency and had been assured by the purchaser that he was of full
age. In the same way they have held employers liable for the un-
lawful employment of minors even though they had no knowledge
of the minority and had, in fact, been told by the child and its parents
44See Goodall v. State, 1 Ore. 334 (1861), where the court said that there
would be no such thing as self-defense if this rule were applied in situations
involving firearms.
A similar change resulted in cases where one person sued another for
civil assault, and it was proved that the gun so used was unloaded. Under
the established doctrine, to recover for an assault it was necessary that the
party threatening an injury have the present ability. But the courts soon
realized that it was in the interest of public safety and welfare not to per-
mit such conduct to continue with impunity-in such an instance where a
person was threatened with a firearm which, for all he knew, had the appar-
ent ability to send a bullet through his body. So, in Beach v. Hancock, 27
N. H. 223, 59 Am. Dec. 373 (1853), apparent ability was held to suffice. The
same development is found in criminal cases. The criminal law once required"present ability" before a prosecution could be had for an assault. But the
courts realized that "a breach of the peace" or a "tragedy" was as likely to
occur whether a gun was loaded or not. The rule was changed to meet the
new problem presented by the firearm. See State v. Smith, 21 Tenn. 457
(1841) ; State v. Archer. 8 Kan. App. 737, 54 Pac. 927 (1898) ; Price v. United
States, 156 Fed. 950, 15 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1272, 13 Ann. Cas. 483 (1907). For
a discussion of this judicial evolution see Inbau, Firearms and Legal Doctrine,
7 Tulane Law Rev. 529.45Keep v. Qualinan, 68 Wis. 451; People v. Motuzas, 185 N. E. 615.
46Beach v. Hancock (1853) 27 N. H. 223.
47Phillips v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. 328; People v. Motuzas, 185 N. E. 615.48See Inbau, Firearms and Legal Doctrine, 7 Tulane Law Rev. 529.
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that he was beyond the age below which such employment was pro-
hibited.49
Even if these decisions are not reversed is there any reason why
we should not extend the right to detain for investigation not only
nightwalkers but suspicious characters generally and especially men
with prior criminal records even though we have no specific evidence
against them. Such men may be innocent and their individual freedom
may be interferred with. Yet individual liberty is not always recog-
nized and in order that justice may be administered and that the laws
may be interfered with. Yet individual liberty is not always recog-
which require witnesses to furnish bail and to be held to testify.50
Is there not indeed much of suggestion in the insistence by former
Chief Justice Taft in the case of Carroll v. United States5' that after
all it is only unreasonable searches and seizures that are prohibited
and that what is reasonable and what is probable cause depends
largely upon the circumstances which surround the particular case
or the particular public exigencies. Is there not much ground for
thought in his analysis of the case of Boyd v. United States52 and
his approval of that part of the decision therein in which the Supreme
Court denies the applicability of the search and seizure clauses of
the Constitution to searches for stolen or forfeited goods, or goods
liable to duties and which are concealed to avoid the payment thereof
and to "the supervision authorized to be exercised by the officers of
the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles"
or " for the search and seizure of articles and things which it
is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose
of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, and
implements of gaming, etc." ?53 Does not a concealed revolver come
within these classes. The search, indeed, is made not for the purpose
of convicting the defendant but for the protection of the public and
the suppression of a public nuisance and an object of public danger.
Although the courts of a number of the states" have insisted in such
cases and even although on a search of the person a concealed weapon
has 'been discovered, that no offense has been committed in the pres-
49People v. Falk (II.) 141 N. E. 719; State v. Cloughly (Ia.) 35 N. W.
652; Shear v. Green, 73 Ia. 688, 36 N. W. 642; State v. Donovan, 10 N. Dak.
203.
5022 Enc. of P. & P. 1343.
5'See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132. Consta. Amend. 4.
52116 U. S. 616.
2See opinion in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149. See dissent-
ing opinion of Justices Stone and De Young, in People v. De Luca, 343 Ill.
269, 272.
54See note 9 ante.
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ence of the officer and that therefore there is no reasonable cause
for the arrest and consequently the gun is inadmissible in evidence,
much more salutary, we believe, is the doctrine of the Court of
Special Sessions of the City of New York in People v. Didonna,"5
which sees in the very finding of a gun on the person convincing proof
of that reasonable cause. Is there not much of wisdom in the sug-
gestion of the court in that case, that "to require a search warrant
before it (the gun) may be discovered is providing a means for
putting the weapon out of the reach of the search warrant"? Is it
not also a fact of some interest that in the states where this rule
is chiefly applied and arrests for the inspection of gunmen is most
frowned upon by the courts the homicide rate is excessively high?
While, indeed, the homicide rate is 12 per 100,000 population
in Spokane, Washington, and Terre Haute, Indiana; 13 in Cleve-
land, Ohio, and Trenton, New Jersey; it is 53 in Lexington, Ken-
tucky, 52 in Jacksonville, Florida, 54 in Memphis, Tennessee, 44 in
Little Rock, Arkansas, 43 in Charleston, South Carolina, 40 in Bir-
mingham, Alabama, 39 in Atlanta, Georgia, 35 in Miami, Florida, 36
in Savannah, Georgia, 33 in Macon, Georgia, 29 in Dallas, Texas, and
22 even in Washington, D. C.
5 6
It is true that in many of these states an attempt is made to attribute
the high homicide rate to the existence of a large negro population,
but the fact still remains that by far the greater proportion of the
murders committed by the negro are committed by the use of firearms.
Though, indeed, a recent study of the city of Memphis, Tennessee,
has disclosed the fact that though perhaps 85 per cent of the murders
can be attributed to the negroes who only constitute one-half of the
population, it also has disclosed the fact that at least 78 per cent of
these murders were accomplished by the use of firearms.57  Per-
haps it might be well if the courts of the states who strenuously
object to the examination of the gunman would pay some heed to
these figures.
Even where the detention or arrest for examination is made
in the day time, but where the commission of an actual crime of
55210 N. Y. S. 135 (1925). In State v. Grant, 79 Ino. 113 (1883), the
court also suggested that the guilt of the arrested person ought at least to
be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the officer had real
reason for believing him guilty. See also State v. Whitley (Ino. 1916) 183
S, W. Rep. 317.
56See last report of Actuary Frederick L. Hoffman to Prudential Life
Insurance Company, published in the press under date of March 30, 1933.
57Bruce and Fitzgerald, A Study of Crime in the City of Memphis, Ten-
nessee, 29 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology No. 2, part 2 (August,
1928).
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carrying concealed weapons is disclosed or conclusively proved by
the discovery of the gun itself, we see no reason why there should be
any hesitancy in allowing the proof in the criminal courts. Of course
we cannot afford to expose everyone to unlimited and uncontrolled
police interference and of course one who is unlawfully and unrea-
sonable detained or searched should have his remedy in a suit for
damages. We must, however, be willing to concede some measure
of judgment and discretion to exist among our police and at any rate
we should select officers who possess it. Surely one who by such
an examination and under such circumstances as were present in the
iacklin case, and even in that of Murray Humphreys, is disclosed
to be a law breaker, that is to say, a carrier of concealed weapons,
should not be allowed to complain of an inspection which his past
habits and those of his companions makes necessary.58 The very
finding of the gun disclosed the necessity.59 The gist of the offense
of carrying concealed weapons is the concealment and a rule of law
is clearly absurd which makes that concealment possible of detec-
tion and punishment only if the guilty person commits some other and
distinct crime either in the presence of the officer or for which a
warrant has been obtained for which he can be arrested or has so
lifted the veil of secrecy and of concealment that someone knows of
the fact and can swear out a warrant. Our most dangerous gun-
men do not work that way. They have to be caught on the run.
Surely the present emergency needs some kind of relief.
When it comes to the right of examination and interrogation we
are not without analogy. Even at the time of the sainted Edward
the Confessor in which the supposed "law of the land" or "due
process of law" of the Magna Charta and of the American Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments was supposed to have had its origin, men
were compelled, when demanded by the authorities, to prove title to
the chattels which they carried with them and wandering boys and
men were required to make oath that they would "neither be thieves
nor the companions of thieves."6 Persons may be arrested and even
58William Scott, for instance, was well known as a labor racketeer and
went under the euphoneous name of Three-Fingered Jack. For some time
he had been associated with the Al Capone band of outlaws. In 1919 he
was sent to the Joliet Penitentiary for robbery and served four years before
he was paroled. Prior to that time he had been twice convicted of murder,
though the convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court.
5 People v. Didona, 210 N. Y. S. 135.
60Purchasers also even of personal property had to be witnessed and the
unemployed and unattached were required to furnish sureties, Sharon Turner,
The History of the Anglo Saxons, Vol. III, 130-132. In Ex parte Smith,
135 Mo. 223 and City of St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, it was held that
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punished as vagrants if they are found loitering and have no means
of support, and nightprowlers may be arrested on the mere suspicion
which arises from their environment. 61 Why should the lack of the
means of a livelihood or the fact of the night environment be of
more significance as far, as search and an examination is concerned,
that known association with known criminals and often with known
gunmen?
Is there not a clear distinction between the discovery of a
pistol on a man the only use of which is to kill and the carrying and
concealment of which in itself constitutes a crime and the discovery
of liquor or papers or even of dope which may or may not be unlaw-
fully used and which at the most are only evidence of a possible or
contemplated crime?
Nor do we believe that any difficulty is presented by the Illinois
statute which provides that: "When a person charged with a felony
is suspected by the judge or justice of the peace before whom he is
brought to have upon his person a dangerous weapon or anything
that may be used as evidence of the commission of the offense, the
judge or justice may direct him to be searched in his presence and
such weapon or other thing to be retained, subject to the order of
the court in which the offender may be tried."62
Though of course it may be claimed that this statute negatives
by exclusion the prior right of the police to make such an examina-
tion when the defendant is first arrested we cannot believe and there
is no suggestion in the decisions that such is its purpose. Rather we
believe it was an attempt on the part of the Legislature to make as-
surance doubly sure and to make it certain that though the courts
had before sustained the power of the police to conduct such examina-
tions as a part of the arrest the Illinois judges still retained their
common law powers in such matters and could do that and order that
to be done which the police might have carelessly neglected to do.
Certain it is that so far in no Illinois case has the statute ever been
referred to and the doctrine has been frequently asserted that "the
guarantee of the Constitution is not against all search and seizure
but against unreasonable search and seizure and does not extend
to an immunity from search and seizure on lawful arrest. Where
a crime in fact has been committed and the arrest is made by an
a mere association and companionship with criminals could not be made a
criminal offense.
GiLaurence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14; 2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 13,
sec. 6. c. 12, sec. 20; 2 Hawk. P. C., c. 12, sec. 20; Miles v. Weston, 60 Ill. 361;
People v. Craiq, 152 Cal. 42.
62Smith-Hurd's Statutes (1929) Sec. 699.
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officer who has reasonable ground for believing the person arrested
is implicated in the crime, such officer has a right to search the person
arrested without a search warrant, and in such case the right of
search and seizure is incidental to the right of arrest."'8 8
There is a wide distinction between the revolver which is un-
lawfully carried and the procedure which is or should be adopted in a
case where human life is involved and one in which a mere sumptuary
law is sought to be enforced or evidence obtained which may help
in a prosecution for its violation. There is a clear distinction be-
tween the discovery of a pistol on a man the only use of which is
to kill and the concealment of which in itself constitutes a crime
and the discovery of liquors or documents or even of dope
which may or may not be lawfully used, and which, at the most,
are only evidence of a possible or contemplated crime. In itself the
revolver is a nuisance which should be summarily abated. In the
case of the liquor or the documents there is a search merely for evi-
dence which may or may not be indicative of guilt. In the case of
the concealed gun there is a direct attempt to suppress a nuisance
and the thing suppressed constitutes conclusive evidence of the com-
mission of a crime and of a crime which when once discovered the
defendant is committing in the presence of an officer. Liquor or
papers may or may not be unlawfully used. The courts on the other
hand should be allowed to take judicial notice of the fact that the
primary use of revolvers is to take human life. The menace of the
gunman is too great a menace to be trifled with. Society should be
allowed some measure of self-protection.
Is there not, indeed, much ground for consideration in the holding
and language of the Supreme Court of Missouri ' when in the case
of a prosecution for the murder of a policeman while attempting to
make an arrest, the court said:
"Touching the other conclusion which we reach, and which bot-
toms justification of this arrest on the proven fact that defendant had
but recently committed a felony, it would, we repeat, be a strict and
narrow view to hold that, although defendant ought to have been ar-
rested, and in fact was arrested, such arrest was not warranted,
because the officer did not know of the specific felony theretofore
committed by defendant. In such case the fact of guilt of the recent
felony should be held to deprive the defendant of his right to resist.
Conversely, the lack of scienter in the officer should make such an
63People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421; North v. People. 139 Ill. 81; People v. Hord,
329 Ill. 117; People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 408; People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632.
64State v. Whitley (Mo. 1916) 183 S. W. Rep. 317.
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arrest to depend for its justification wholly upon the truth of de-
fendant's guilt of the antecedent felony. The duty which such an
officer, as a policeman in a large city, owes to society to protect it
from criminals, weighed against the duty such officer owes to the
law-abiding man not unlawfully, or arbitrarily, or with brutal officious-
ness, to deprive him of liberty, requires thus far a modification of the
rule which grants absolute protection to the officer, when we hold
lawful the arrest of one guilty of an antecedent felony which is
unknown to the arresting officer. In short, applying the general rule
to the concrete case, if defendant had not been guilty of recently
robbing Ladinsky, then deceased had no right (under this phase of
the case) to arrest defendant, and the latter's right to resist such
arrest would have been fully guaranteed to him. But being guilty,
and knowing his guilt thereof (as the inference is from the jury's
verdict), the duty was by law incumbent on him to submit to this
arrest, under penalty, if he refused, of taking away his defense when
tried for any act done by him while resisting arrest."
Can anyone also deny the fact that the recent cases of People
v. Kissane and People v. Roberts to which we have before referred"
evidence a radical departure from the strict and formal attitude of
the old decisions. Under similar circumstances the old decisions
there would hardly have found reasonable grounds for the arrests
and for the lack of the search warrants. Yet guns were found on
the persons of the defendants and we are quite certain that the find-
ing of the guns did much to induce both the Appellate and Supreme
Court to overlook any informality or deficiency in the matter of the
arrest or the lack of the search warrant and to ignore the fact that
the arrests were madq upon suspicion and upon suspicion alone.
NVhy, indeed, did they not say so? Why did they not clearly an-
nounce the doctrine that the time has now come for the courts to
hold that a gun may now speak for itself, and that the finding upon
a person of a concealed weapon estops the carrier from questioning
the legality of his arrest? Why, indeed, should one be allowed to
appeal to the law for the protection of his rights to personal privacy
when at the very moment and during his arrest (for the weapon is
still being concealed) he is committing a crime and is defying the
very government whose protection he seeks?
65See ante.
